PsyArt

Freud, Reluctant Philosopher

By Walter Schönau

Professor Emeritus, German Literary History

University of Groningen

Abstract

Sigmund Freud held an ambivalent stance toward philosophy. While as a young man he briefly aspired to become a philosopher himself, his later views were marked by skepticism and even disdain. As a medical doctor and a child of the Enlightenment, he sought to operate in a strictly scientific manner, eschewing what he viewed as the metaphysical speculation typical of "the philosophers." In the practice of his psychoanalytic work, however, he was not always able to uphold his anti-metaphysical principles. Even more ironically, Freud's psychoanalysis, with its groundbreaking emphasis on the unconscious, had a profound influence on 20th- and 21st-century philosophy, shaping the ideas of thinkers such as Sartre, Foucault, Derrida, Wittgenstein, Adorno, Habermas, and others.

Keywords: Sigmund Freud, Freud's ambivalence toward philosophy, psychoanalyzing philosophical theories, philosophical aspects of psychoanalysis, influence of psychoanalysis on 20th and 21st century philosophy

To cite as: Schönau, W., 2024, "Freud, Reluctant Philosopher," *PsyArt* 28, pp. 105-122.

Freud's Criticism of Philosophy

Was Freud a philosopher? He was a neurologist, medical doctor, psychiatrist, and the first psychoanalyst, but he was not a philosopher *pur sang*. In the company of Plato, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, he does not belong, and therefore he is absent from many philosophical textbooks. However, this does not mean that he was not an important thinker who – much like Darwin, Marx, or Einstein – has had a profound influence on the culture of our time.

Freud had no desire to be a philosopher. He seized every opportunity to express his skeptical attitude toward "the philosophers." Just as he rarely spoke of literature but preferred to speak of the writers ("die Dichter"), so too did he avoid talking about philosophy itself, choosing instead to refer to "die Philosophen" – almost always in a disparaging tone. In his self-portrait, Freud remarked with unmistakable irony, "Even where I strayed from direct observation, I took care to avoid approaching actual philosophy. An innate incapacity made this abstention quite effortless for me" (Vol. 9, p. 124). He preferred to be regarded as a strictly natural-scientific observer. In a letter to his Hungarian colleague and friend Sándor Ferenczi – whose thoughts sometimes soared to lofty heights – Freud articulated his ideal: one should not attempt to fabricate theories; rather, these should emerge unexpectedly, like uninvited guests, while one is occupied with detailed research (letter of July 31, 1915). His aversion to philosophy was primarily driven by his distrust of older traditions within academic philosophy, particularly those of system-builders who had constructed a coherent and 'watertight' worldview. These systems were built upon both observation and speculation as foundational elements, yet they did not always seem to draw a clear boundary between the two. Moreover, Freud harbored reservations about the certitude and pretensions to absolute truth with which such philosophies were presented. He distrusted intuition and speculation, placing his faith exclusively in observation and reason. Freud shared

with Heinrich Heine a mocking disdain for the German philosophy professor, who, armed with the trappings of the *Spießbürger* (petty bourgeois), patched the gaps in his philosophical system with unwarranted self-assurance:

> Zu fragmentarisch ist Welt und Leben!
> Ich will mich zum deutschen Professor begeben.
> Der weiß das Leben zusammenzusetzen,
> Und er macht ein verständlich System daraus;
> Mit seinen Nachtmützen und Schlafrockfetzen
> Stopft er die Lücken des Weltenbaus.[1]

Those final two lines were part of his usual repertoire of aphoristic expressions (cf. Vol. 2, p. 466*n* and Vol. 10, p. 213). Another favorite quote, this time from Schiller's poem 'Die Weltweisen (The Philosophers)', which appears at least nine times in Freud's collected works, expressed a similar critique of the intellectual constructions of philosophers.

Their powerless attempts to grasp "was die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält (what holds the world together at its core)", as Goethe's *Faust* puts it, are contrasted by Schiller with the force of nature – understood by Schiller, as by Freud, primarily as the life of the drives:

> Doch weil, was ein Professor spricht,
> Nicht gleich zu allen dringet,

[1] Too fragmented are world and life! Let me turn to the German professor. He knows how to piece life together, and creates a comprehensible system of it; with his nightcaps and dressing-gown scraps, he fills the gaps in the fabric of the universe. Heinrich Heine, *Buch der Lieder*, 'Die Heimkehr', LVIII (1823).

So übt *Natur* die Mutterpflicht
Und sorgt, daß nie die Kette bricht
Und daß der Reif nie springet.
Einstweilen, bis den Bau der Welt
Philosophie zusammenhält,
Erhält *sie* das Getriebe
Durch Hunger und durch Liebe.[2]

In other words, it is the biological drives that uphold 'das Weltganze (the totality of the world)', not the speculative constructs of idealistic or moral philosophy. For a sceptic like Freud, Schiller's verses came close to being a revelation. In his theory of drives, Freud consistently returned to this fundamental insight into the power of hunger and love. When asked about his contribution to the understanding of humanity, Freud once remarked, "Die Menschheit hat ja gewußt, daß sie Geist hat, ich mußte ihr zeigen, daß es auch Triebe gibt (Humanity already knew it possessed a mind; I had to show it that there are drives as well)." Accordingly, Freud deliberately confined himself, as he put it, to the basement and ground floor of the "Bau der Welt (structure of the world)", emphasizing the biological aspects of human nature. From this vantage point, he sought to understand the 'higher' levels of the edifice, *viz.* those of an idealistic, religious, or spiritual nature.

A second reason for his rejection of philosophy was his fear of being disturbed in

[2] But since what a professor says, does not immediately reach all, nature takes on the motherly duty, ensuring the chain never breaks and the ring never snaps. Meanwhile, until the structure of the world is held together by philosophy, its machinery is sustained by hunger and by love. Friedrich Schiller, *Gedichte* 1786-1795, 'Die Weltweisen'.

his own steadily advancing thought process by the thinkers he knew to be his predecessors, *viz.* Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. *Noli turbare circulos meos* was his secret motto, especially when it came to related thinkers. Regarding the striking parallels between psychoanalysis and Schopenhauer's teachings, such as the primacy of affectivity, the significance of sexuality, and the mechanism of repression, Freud remarked that these similarities could not be attributed to any familiarity with Schopenhauer's work. Moreover, he added, he had only read this philosopher very late in life (Vol. 9, p. 124). As for Nietzsche, Freud claimed that his attempts to read him had been thwarted by an *excess of interest* ("an einem Übermaß von Interesse erstickt (suffocated by an overabundance of interest)", *Protokolle* I, p. 338 and II, p. 28) – a highly ambivalent statement! – and that he had deliberately *avoided* Nietzsche for a long time, precisely because of their intellectual kinship: "in this case, it was less a matter of priority than of preserving my naturalness" (*ibid.*). Yet, in other contexts, such as his discovery of the anesthetic properties of cocaine, he was very concerned with the priority of discoveries. In a similar vein, he writes elsewhere:

> The profound enjoyment to be derived from Nietzsche's works I later denied myself, with the deliberate reasoning that I wished to process psychoanalytic impressions unencumbered by any preconceived expectations. In return, I had to be willing – and I gladly am – to forgo any claims to priority in the many instances where the arduous labour of psychoanalytic research merely affirms the philosopher's intuitively achieved insights (Vol. 6, p. 367).

Not only Lou Andreas-Salomé, who had been Nietzsche's lover, but many of Freud's other disciples (Rank, Stekel, Winterstein, Hitschmann, Tausk) were philosophically trained and had an interest in philosophical matters. They frequently drew his attention to striking parallels between his ideas and certain passages in

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. This, however, only deepened Freud's strong "anxiety of influence" (Harold Bloom), the anxious concern to preserve his intellectual spontaneity. Had he truly studied Nietzsche, then not only the philosopher's sweeping criticism of rationality but also his radical psychology of unmasking might have deprived Freud of the spontaneousness and sense of originality in his own thought processes. In the relatively few references to their work in Freud's collected writings (both are mentioned roughly 12 times), Schopenhauer and Nietzsche appear exclusively as authoritative witnesses, never as teachers. According to Freud himself, his true teachers were the great writers of world literature: Sophocles, Shakespeare, Goethe, Dostoevsky. More than in philosophical reasoning he placed trust in artistic intuition. Yet both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche had already emphatically argued that human beings are primarily creatures driven by irrational forces, profoundly prone to overestimating their rationality. They only differed on the way out of this disillusioning and painful realization; Schopenhauer sought salvation in renunciation of the drives, in Nirvana, while Nietzsche, at least in theory, championed the affirmation of the drives ("Triebbejahung") and condemned the pursuit of asceticism.

Psychoanalysis of Philosophy

As psychoanalysis gradually developed into a theoretical system of its own, this – personally motivated – skeptical resistance to philosophy evolved into an analytically grounded critique of philosophy as such. Freud paid little attention to the 'ideological' dimensions of this critique, quite the contrary. Just as he viewed obsessive-compulsive neurosis, with its ceremonial rituals and prohibitions, as a caricature of religion, and hysteria, with its mimicking expression of fantasy material, as a caricature of art, Freud described paranoia as a caricature of philosophical systems: "even the delusional constructs of paranoiacs reveal an unwelcome external

resemblance and intrinsic kinship with the systems of our philosophers" (Vol. 8, p. 502). By this, Freud suggested that the aspiration to construct a comprehensive, gapless worldview might, in his view, represent an expression of a – albeit sublimated – delusion of reference, and, at times, even resemble a state of delirium. He held the opinion that neurotics, in an asocial manner, attempt to resolve the same conflicts that literature, religion, and philosophy address in ways more acceptable to most people (ibid.).

The psychoanalysis of philosophy as a professional activity draws our attention to the hidden motives behind the need for a closed worldview, seeking the subjective foundations, the more or less hidden desires and fears, upon which such a construct, despite its pretension of objectivity, always appears to rest. Indeed, as psychobiographical research can easily demonstrate, philosophers tend to generalize or absolutize highly individual preoccupations, idiosyncrasies, and unconscious fantasies into a representation of the *condition humaine*. The mere existence of a history of philosophy already points to the time-bound nature of all systems and relativizes their claims to absolute validity. In his remarks on psychoanalysis's 'importance for philosophy', Freud phrased it more diplomatically: "In no other discipline than philosophy is the personality of the scholarly practitioner assigned such a significant role" (Vol. 6, p. 268). According to him, psychoanalysis can "demonstrate the subjective and individual motivation of philosophical doctrines that are supposedly the result of impartial logical work" (ibid.), although, of course, reason compels one to acknowledge that "the psychological determination of a doctrine in no way excludes its scientific accuracy."

In his discussions with students and colleagues in the *Mittwoch-Gesellschaft*, Freud expressed himself somewhat less reservedly, as the minutes of these meetings reveal. According to Freud, philosophers, ensnared in their own world of thought,

remain stuck in their Oedipal conflict constellation, whereas natural scientists, aware of the provisional nature of their observations, have overcome their Oedipus complex.

A professional philosopher is someone who has discovered the functional pleasure of thinking for the sake of thinking itself. The source of this intellectual pleasure, Freud argues, lies in the sexual curiosity of youth and the explorations that arise from it. The burning question of where children come from typically remains unanswered – at least in Freud's time and culture – and is repressed during the latency period. Only a few creative researchers have managed to sublimate this need for knowledge; they have escaped either the cognitive inhibition or the compulsive thinking of the neurotic and have transformed this need into a source of intellectual productivity.

Philosophy and Science

Freud thus tended to distinguish between, on the one hand, philosophy based on intuition and speculation, which he associated with neurosis and regression, and, on the other hand, science, focused on truth and objectivity, which he considered an expression of mental health and associated with progression. In his self-image as an illusion-free scientist, there was no room for the 'philosophical' or analytical contemplation of the potentially illusory premises of this dichotomy. For him, this dichotomy served as a rhetorical strategy, one that helped him suppress doubts and convince himself: he regarded psychoanalysis as an objective, empirically grounded science that should refrain from engaging with philosophy, which he saw as based on subjective or intuitive principles. This stance has led to ongoing uncertainty about the true nature of psychoanalysis and controversies surrounding it, both within and outside its ranks.

Another objection Freud raises against philosophers, insofar as they do not

belong to the school of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, is their equating the psyche with the conscious mind (Vol. 6, p. 268). In doing so, they close their eyes to the power of the unconscious and contribute to a distortion of their worldview. In short, they fail to recognize that when it comes to their inner life, humans are not masters of their own home. This amounts to a denial of what Freud referred to as the psychological injury to humanity caused by his insights. Philosophy is always exposed to the risk of projecting inner perceptions onto the external world and then mistaking them for reality, a way of thinking from the mythological era. Philosophers believe they obey the reality principle, but are often blind to the hidden infantile desires underlying their system of thought, and thus to the pleasure principle that also governs their thinking. As Freud never tired of warning, our intellect is subject to the primacy of affect – and not the other way round, as we like to believe. All thinking, therefore, tends to be 'wishful thinking.' Philosophy, as the eminent Freudscholar Samuel IJsseling suggests, seeks to avoid the truth, or, in Freud's words, humans are constitutionally unfit for the practice of science (Vol. 10, p. 80). However, this insight did not prevent Freud from maintaining his belief in science as the only path to truth, a belief that Nietzsche, with his perspectivism and fundamental critique of truth, had already contested before him. In the discussions of the *Mittwoch-Gesellschaft*, he also included Nietzsche among the 'intuitive' philosophers, the 'Nicht-Wissenschaftler (the non-scientists)', thereby fending off the persistent doubts about scientific validity, including those concerning his own psychoanalysis.

Freud's 'misosophy', his hatred of philosophy, was shared by many Austrian thinkers of his time and later, including Franz Brentano, an opponent of Kant with whom Freud attended lectures as a student, as well as Ernst Mach, Husserl, Wittgenstein, and the members of the Vienna Circle. According to Patrizia Giampieri Deutsch (1992, p. 70), it is a typical Austrian tradition to regard philosophizing as

something pathological, a neurotic symptom, or a mental cramp (Wittgenstein).

Freud believed that a 'Weltanschauung' was essentially a kind of catechism for intellectuals, or a travel guide, akin to the then-popular Baedeker, for life's journey, offering explanations and a list of all its obstacles and landmarks. He himself thought he had to find his way without such a guide and adhered to his 'wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung (scientific worldview)', which always remains provisional and open to revision on the basis of new experiences or insights. In his lecture on psychoanalysis and worldview, he summarized his position as follows:

> Philosophy does not oppose science; it behaves like a science, partly using the same methods, but it diverges from this by clinging to the illusion that it can offer a coherent worldview without gaps, which must collapse with every new advance in our knowledge. Methodologically, it makes the mistake of overestimating the epistemological value of our logical operations and of acknowledging other sources of knowledge, such as intuition (Vol. 10, p. 213).

Freud as a philosophical thinker

This image of Freud as an anti-philosopher is, however, only half the truth. Freud was in fact ambivalent towards philosophy, and his criticism, upon closer examination, targeted only a specific sector of it – one that he even, in some ways, caricatured. His self-image as a strict empiricist who mistrusted any form of intuition, and in whose view philosophy could only be a pseudo-science, requires correction. An "innate incapacity" for philosophy cannot, in any case, be attributed to him. Anyone who reads his work can observe on multiple occasions that he struggled to restrain his own tendency to speculate and often succumbed to it. His writings on the theory of drives, with their unverifiable dualism of Eros versus the death drive, his highly

speculative essays on Michelangelo's Moses and the Moses of the Old Testament, and indeed the entire metapsychological superstructure of his theory, clearly demonstrate this. At times, in conversations or letters, he admitted this, but in his scholarly work, he attempted, with varying success, to conceal this side of himself. In theory, he adhered to the separation between philosophy and psychoanalysis, but in the practice of his work, this was, of course, impossible. The unmasking of philosophy as a form of illusionary thinking, a path Nietzsche had already followed, is in essence nothing other than philosophizing – just a different kind of philosophizing from what he had in mind.

After reading the lyrical-romantic fragment 'Über die Natur (On Nature)', which had long been attributed to Goethe but was later revealed to have been written by Georg Christoph Tobler, Freud decided to pursue medicine instead of philosophy. A typical work of natural philosophy, rich in imagery and metaphors, inspired him to make this academic choice, which, ironically, would eventually lead him to a sharp condemnation of the following kind of views of nature:

> Natur! Wir sind von ihr umgeben und umschlungen – unvermögend aus ihr herauszutreten, und unvermögend tiefer in sie hineinzukommen. Ungebeten und ungewarnt nimmt sie uns in den Kreislauf ihres Tanzes auf und treibt sich mit uns fort, bis wir ermüdet sind und ihrem Arme entfallen. Sie schafft ewig neue Gestalten, was da ist, war noch nie, was war, kommt nicht wieder – alles ist neu, und doch immer das Alte. Wir leben mitten in ihr und sind ihr fremd. Sie spricht unaufhörlich mit uns und verrät uns ihr Geheimnis nicht. Wir wirken beständig auf sie und haben doch keine Gewalt über sie.[3]

[3] Nature! We are surrounded and embraced by her – incapable of stepping out of her, and incapable of entering her more deeply. Uninvited and unwarned, she takes us into the cycle of her dance and carries us along until we are weary and fall from her embrace. She endlessly creates new forms; what

As a young student, Freud attended lectures by Franz Brentano, engaged in discussions with him, and, impressed by these experiences, decided to pursue a doctorate in philosophy, as he informed his childhood friend Silberstein in a letter (March 7, 1875). However, later that same year, he already reconsidered: "Regarding philosophy, I am more skeptical than ever" (letter of September 9, 1875). In one of his letters to his friend Wilhelm Fließ, he confessed, "how, in the deepest secrecy, I nurture the hope of reaching my true goal, philosophy, via the same paths. For that was my original intention, when I had not yet clearly realized what I am here for in this world" (January 1, 1896). He left no room for misunderstanding about that mission. It consisted, in addition to devising a revolutionary theory of the dynamic unconscious, of combatting illusions, errors, superstition, and prejudice. He especially did not wish to offer comfort when that implied a certain false- hood. "As a young man, I knew no other desire than that for philosophical knowledge", he wrote to Fließ shortly thereafter (April 2, 1896). And to Jung, in a rare moment of self-reflection, he admitted, "that I have no aptitude for inductive research, that I am entirely intuitive, and that I have had to impose extraordinary discipline on myself when I began to establish the purely empirically verifiable psychoanalysis" (letter of December 17, 1911, trans. W.S.). Indeed, what are his culture-critical essays, such as *Civilization and Its Discontents* and *The Future of an Illusion*, if not philosophical reflections?

---

is, has never been, and what was, will not return – everything is new, yet always the same. We live within her, yet we are strangers to her. She speaks incessantly to us and does not reveal her secret. We constantly act upon her, yet we have no power over her. *Das Journal von Tiefurt*. Hrsg. von Eduard von der Hellen. Weimar 1892.

Freud's worldview was shaped during his student years by the prevailing academic doctrines of the time: an anti-metaphysical materialism, skeptical positivism and empiricism, and an unwavering belief in the causal determination of all phenomena, which relegated typical 'philosophical' problems such as free will to the status of mere pseudo-problems. He was influenced by the spirit of biophysicalism, which recognized no forces within the organism other than the physical-chemical, and which rejected the vitalistic philosophy of nature from the past. As a student, he learned the strictly natural scientific approach from leading figures in the medical world of the time, such as Helmholtz, Theodor Meynert, and Ernst Brücke, all of whom were held in great esteem. He remained committed to this approach, even when he ventured into the realm of hermeneutics with *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

Obviously, from our perspective, this unshakable belief in the scientific approach was an ideology like any other, yet it was regarded at the time as the *via regia* to truth. Freud was no exception in this regard. The theory of evolution by Darwin, Feuerbach's materialist anthropology, and John Stuart Mill's empiricism made a great impression on him during his high school and student years. In his psychological theories, he primarily drew on the work of Gustav Fechner and Theodor Lipps. In his view of human nature, he was primarily influenced by Darwin, whose work he aimed to continue within psychology by initially approaching all phenomena from a genetic perspective and closely linking ontogenesis and phylogenesis. His structural model of the psyche was a combination of mechanistic-physiological and biologically evolutionary concepts.

Following Auguste Comte, Freud divided cultural history into three broad stages: the theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific era, viewing himself as a representative of the latter. He found a similar division in Edward Tylor's work, who identified three periods: animism, religion, and science. Although philosophy

considered itself part of the third stage, he actually regarded it as a regression to the second stage, suspecting that it had not entirely overcome the belief in the omnipotence of thought.

With his favorite poet Heine, his "Unglaubensgenosse (fellow non-believer)", Freud shared the conviction that traditional religious belief in God was a naive illusion: "we leave heaven to the angels and the sparrows" ["den Himmel überlassen wir den Engeln und den Spatzen"] (Vol. 9, p. 402). In his thinking, he followed a natural development from the therapy of neuroses to philosophical anthropology – thus returning to the interests of his youth. Would he have suspected that he gave modern philosophy an entirely new direction? The fact is that nearly all prominent philosophers of the previous and current centuries – whether writing in German, English, or French – were profoundly influenced by him.

His contributions to modern and postmodern philosophy lie in the fact that he, as a faithful adherent of the Enlightenment, set out to study the power of the irrational through a rational approach, without idealizing the unconscious, as many followers did. What in German philosophy is called "das Andere der Vernunft (the other of reason)" and what the Romantic movement had begun to rediscover after the Enlightenment had suppressed it, he did not glorify but made the subject of study and analysis. He did not become an advocate of the irrational, like the representatives of the 'Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life)', nor did he proclaim a doctrine of salvation, as one might claim about Jung in certain respects. A telling remark, therefore, is Freud's sarcastic aside about Jung: "when this researcher was merely a psychoanalyst and had not yet wished to be a prophet" (Vol. 7, p. 436). That is also why he opposed philosophers who regarded the unconscious as "something mystical" (Vol. 6, p. 268). Psychoanalysis was to be "free from tendencies" (Vol. 8, p. 58) and not to propagate a worldview. His belief in the ideals of the Enlightenment was

unwavering, as evidenced by his utopian fantasy of a "dictatorship of reason" (Vol. 10, p. 248) or his warning "against the black mudstream of occultism" (Jung 1963, p. 155).

Towards a philosophy of psychoanalysis

Jürgen Habermas has speculated that the true philosophical achievement of our time might eventually be seen in our giving up the paradigm of consciousness. While Schopenhauer and Nietzsche had laid the foundations for this shift, it was Freud who truly opened the unconscious to scientific inquiry, 'mapped it out,' and explored the implications of this paradigm change. His philosophical significance is thus primarily situated in the realms of philosophical anthropology and cultural philosophy. The psychoanalytic conception of humanity revised the traditional view of man as *animal rationale*, replacing it with the image of beings driven by instincts, shaped by unconscious desires and fears.

In France, all prominent philosophers have engaged extensively with psychoanalysis, often resulting in them putting their own spin on it. Sartre, for instance, developed an 'existential' psychoanalysis as a counterpart to Freud's empirical doctrine, while Merleau-Ponty proposed an 'ontological' psychoanalysis, and Ricoeur distinguished two forms of discourse within psychoanalysis: the energetic and the hermeneutic. Furthermore, important thinkers such as Althusser, Deleuze and Guattari, Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida have extensively studied Freud's work, albeit often critically, frequently declaring early in their analyses that they had moved beyond it. In the German-speaking world, alongside Wittgenstein, it was primarily the philosophers of the Frankfurt School – Horkheimer, Adorno, Habermas, and Herbert Marcuse – who expanded on Freud's ideas within their 'critical theory.' In doing so, they contributed to a philosophy of psychoanalysis that further reflects on the psychoanalysis of philosophy initiated by Freud.

Antoine Mooij recently proposed the idea that psychoanalysis would benefit from acknowledging and embracing its philosophical roots, specifically its foundation in a non- reductive view of humanity. By doing so, it would no longer need to engage in an unequal struggle, "rivalling with numerous empirically-analytical sciences that are bound to the program of their specific scientific doctrines" (2006, p. 114). This would mark a definitive departure from Freud's views regarding the position of psychoanalysis in relation to philosophy and science, but it could also represent a return to the true nature of his project and a promising perspective for psychoanalysis in the present day.[4]

[4] An earlier version of this article appeared in Dutch in 2006 under the title "Freud, filosoof tegen wil en dank," in J.E. Verheugt-Pleiter (ed.), Psychoanalyse anno nu, Assen: Van Gorcum, pp. 25–34. The present English translation is by Maria Kardaun.

References

Bloom, H. (1975), *The anxiety of influence. A theory of poetry.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Freud, S. (1974), *Briefwechsel mit C.G. Jung*. Hrsg. von William McGuire und Wolfgang Sauer- länder. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer.

Freud, S. (1986), *Briefe an Wilhelm Fließ 1887-1904*. Hrsg. von J.M. Masson. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer.

Freud, S. (1989), *Jugendbriefe an Eduard Silberstein 1871-1881*. Hrsg. von Walter Boehlich. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer.

Freud, S. (1996), *Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi*. Ed. by E. Falzeder and E. Brabant. Vol. 2, London, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Freud, S. (2006), *Werken*. 11 delen. Bezorgd door Wilfred Oranje. Amsterdam: Boom [Freud quotations from this edition]

Giampieri Deutsch, P. (1992), 'Alfred von Winterstein und die Rolle der Philosophie in den Diskussionen der Mittwoch-Gesellschaft.' In: *Aus dem Kreis um Sigmund Freud. Zu den Proto- kollen der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung*. Hrsg. von E. Federn und G. Wittenberger. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, pp. 69-95.

Glaser, H. (1979), *Sigmund Freuds Zwanzigstes Jahrhundert. Seelenbilder einer Epoche. Materia- lien und Analysen*. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer.

Gödde, G. (2006), 'Freud und seine Epoche. Philosophischer Kontext.' In: *Freud-Handbuch. Leben – Werk – Wirkung*. Hrsg. von Hans-Martin Lohmann und Joachim Pfeiffer. Stuttgart, Weimar: Metzler, pp. 10-25.

Gondek, H.-D. (2006), 'Philosophie.' In: *Freud-Handbuch. Leben – Werk – Wirkung*. Hrsg. von Hans-Martin Lohmann und Joachim Pfeiffer. Stuttgart, Weimar: Metzler, pp. 348-370.

Haesler, L. (1995), *Auf der Suche nach einer erträglichen Welt. Über den Umgang des Menschen mit der Wirklichkeit*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Jung, C.G. (1963), *Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken*. Zürich, Stuttgart.

Marcuse, L. (1956), *Sigmund Freud. Sein Bild vom Menschen*. Hamburg: Rowohlt.

Mooij, A. (2006), 'Filosofie en de menselijke conditie.' In: *Freuds werken nu, psychoanalyse nu*. Amsterdam: Boom, pp. 109-115.

Protokolle der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung (1972-1981), Hrsg. von H. Nunberg und E. Federn. 4 Bde. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer.